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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Annotated Section 78A-3-
102(3)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIE\V 
1. "\Vhether the court of appeals erred in concluding Respondent 2010-1 RADC 
CADC Venture' s claims against Petitioner could be deemed to relate back to the filing of 
a complaint by another party under the provisions of Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Standard of Appellate Review: De novo. This Court considers appeals from a 
district court's summary judgment decision "under a de n.ovo standard of review, granting 
no deference to the district court's analysis." L.C. Canyon Partners, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake 
Cty., 2011 UT 63, 'il 8, 266 P.3d 797. This de novo standard has also been called 
"correctness" by this Court and applies "regardless of the nature of the underlying law 
governing the parties' rights." Bahr v. bnus, 2011 UT 19, 'il'il 15-16, 250 P.3d 56. See also 
Ga,y Porter Const. v. Fox Const., Inc., 2004 UT App 354, 'il 31, 101 P.3d 371 (holding 
that "a correctness standard applies to a trial court's rule 15( c) analysis"). 
Presented in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at pages 7-10. 
2. Vvhether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's award of 
100% of the amount due on the note to Respondent 2010-1 RADC CADC Venture after 
determining Petitioner's argument was inadequately briefed. 
Standard of Appellate Review: De novo. This Court considers appeals from a 
district court's summary judgment decision "under a de novo standard of review, granting 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
no deference to the district court's analysis." L.C. Canyon Partners, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake 
Ct:y., 2011 UT 63, ii 8, 266 P.3d 797. This de nova standard has also been called 
··correctness" by this Court and applies "'regardless of the nature of the underlying law 
governing the parties~ rights.~' Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19~ ~,I 15-16, 250 P.3d 56. 
Presented in Petition for \Vrit of Certiorari at pages 10-13. 
DETER.1VITNITIVE PROVISION 
Utah Code Annotated§ 57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee -- Action to 
recover balance due upon obligation for which trust deed was given as security --
Collection of costs and attorney's fees. 
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed as provided 
in Sections 57-1-23, 57-1-24, and 57-1-27, an action may be commenced to recover the 
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, and in 
that action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness that was 
secured by the trust deed, the amount for which the property was sold, and the fair market 
value of the property at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the court shall find 
the fair market value of the property at the date of sale. The court may not render 
judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with 
interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the 
fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought under 
this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and reasonable 
attorney fees incurred. 
STATEl\IBNT OF THE CASE 
This case was originally brought as a deficiency action by a plaintiff with a 52% 
interest in the loan. Though the other plaintiff did not bring a deficiency action within the 
three-month statute of limitations and owned only a 48% interest in the loan, the district 
court granted that party summary judgment and a\\rarded it a judgment for 100% of the 
total amount due under the note. The court of appeals affirmed. The petitioners seek 
review by this Court. 
2 
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Procedural History 
On January 14, 2011, subsequent to a foreclosure sale that occurred on December 
3, 2010, Utah First Federal Credit Union ("Utah First") commenced an action for 
deficiency against Dos Lagos, LLC; Mellon Valley, LLC; Roland Neil Family Limited 
Partnership; Roland N. Walker; and Sally ,valker (collectively "Dos Lagos"). (R. 1-28.) 
Utah First alleged that the total amount due on the loan was $1,819,774.97. Ten months 
later, on November 15, 2011, Utah First filed an Amended Complaint, adding 2010-1 
RADC/CADC Venture, LLC ("RADC") as a plaintiff, asserting that Utah First had an 
undivided 52% interest in the loan and RADC had a 48% undivided interest in the loan, 
and leaving the total amount due on the loan as $1,819,774.97. (R. 303-334.) Ten months 
after that, on September 7, 2012, Utah First and RADC filed a Second Amended 
Complaint, modifying the total amount due under the promissory note at the time of the 
foreclosure sale from $1,819,774.97 to $3,426,701.91. (R. 635-642.) 
In 2012, Utah First and RADC filed motions for summary judgment. Dos Lagos 
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The district court denied Utah First' s 
motion1, denied Dos Lagos's motion, and granted RADC's motion for summary 
judgment in its Ruling on Dispositive Motions dated April 25, 2013. 2 (R. 826-838.) The 
district court subsequently entered t\vo additional orders. The first, dated July 25, 2013, 
1 The court denied Utah First's motion for summary judgment due to unresolved 
questions of fact relating to whether its participation in the loan was legal and whether 
any of the Dos Lagos parties were members of the credit union. Utah First subsequently 
sought and received leave to voluntarily dismiss its claims without prejudice, rendering 
RADC' s judgments final. (R. 1097-1101.) 
2 This ruling is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
3 
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awarded RA.DC a judgment against Dos Lagos and Mellon Valley in the total amount due 
under the loan, minus the fair market value of the property foreclosed on by Utah First. 3 
(R. 936-939.) The second, dated August 16, 2013, awarded RA.DC a judgment against the 
guarantors of the loan, the Roland Neil Family Limited Partnership, Roland N. \Valker, 
and Sally \Valker. 4 (R. 991-993.) 
In an opinion dated April 28, 2016, the court of appeals affirmed the district 
court's rulings, orders, and judgments. 2010-1 RA.DC/CA.DC Venture, LLC v. Dos Lagos, 
LLC, 2016 UT App 89,372 P.3d 683. 5 
Statement of Facts 
The facts in this case are generally not in dispute. The follO\ving facts are 
condensed principally from the district court's Ruling on Dispositive A1otions (R. 826-
838), with additional record citations as appropriate: 
1. Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC entered into a Business Loan 
Agreement with America Vvest Bank in 1v1arch 2007. (R. 768-775.) 
2. On December 6, 2007, America \Vest Bank entered into a loan 
Participation Agreement with Utah First wherein America \Vest Bank retained an 
undivided 48% interest in the loan and Utah First obtained an undivided 52% interest in 
the loan. (R. 555-559, 786-790.) 
3. On December 5, 2008, Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC executed 
a Change in Terms Agreement, which restated, modified and extended their Promissory 
3 This judgment is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
4 This judgment is attached hereto as Addendum D. 
5 This opinion is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
4 
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Note with America West Bank dated March 29, 2007, with a principal amount of 
$2,500,000.00. (R. 561-563.) 
4. The Promissory Note was secured by real property owned by Mellon 
Valley, LLC located in Hurricane, Washington County, Utah. (R. 565-572.) 
5. On May 1, 2009, the FDIC closed America \Vest Bank and seized its 
interest in the Promissory Note. (R. 546-554.) 
6. In 2010, the FDIC auctioned, sold, assigned, and transferred America West 
Bank's interest in the Promissory Note to 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC. (R. 792-
795.) 
7. On December 6, 2010, the property securing the Promissory Note was sold 
at trustee's sale for $1,060,000.00 to the highest bidder, 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, 
LLC. (R. 546-554, 590-591.) 
8. The value of the property securing the Promissory Note was $1,510,000.00 
at the time of the December 6, 2010 trustee's sale. (R. 620-625.) 
9. On December 6, 2010, the outstanding payoff balance on the loan was 
$3,426,701.91. (R. 546-554.) 
10. The Roland Neil Family Limited Partnership, Roland N. \Valker, and Sally 
Walker personally guaranteed the loan. (R. 776-784.) 
SUMl\fARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals failed to correctly apply Utah law to its analysis of the statute 
of limitations issues in this case and improperly affirmed the judgment of 100% of the 
amount due under the loan to RADC, which owns only a 48% interest in the loan. 
5 
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RA.DC did not file an action within the three-month statute of limitations, and its 
claim against Dos Lagos is accordingly barred. The court of appeals erred in holding that 
the Rule 15(c) relation back doctrine extended to allow the addition of RA.DC's tardy 
claim. The relation back doctrine found in the actual language of Rule 15(c) does not 
apply to the addition of parties. But the court of appeals held that the exception, which 
allows relation back for new parties with an identity of interest to the old parties, applied 
to RA.DC's new claim on two grounds: notice and identity of interest. 
The court of appeals incorrectly found that notice of Utah First's claim \\'as 
sufficient to give Dos Lagos notice of R.ADC's claim. Utah First brought suit for 
deficiency against Dos Lagos and claimed only its 52% share of the amount due under 
the note. Nothing about that claim gave notice to Dos Lagos that RA.DC intended to bring 
an action to collect on its independent 48% interest. 
The court of appeals also incorrectly found that Utah First and RA.DC had an 
identity of interest sufficient to trigger the exception. Utah law clearly holds that privity 
of contract is not sufficient to establish an identity of interest. In this case, Utah First and 
RA.DC' s only link is their contractual loan pai1icipation agreement. The two entities 
obtained their interests in the loan separately, have separate business operations, and had 
legally different results before the trial court. Further, Utah precedent and policy dictate 
that procedural rules cannot override clear statutory requirements like the three-month 
deadline found in the deficiency statute. 
RA.DC, under both statute and contract, is entitled to collect only its 48% interest 
in the loan. The court of appeals incorrectly held that Dos Lagos failed to adequately 
6 
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brief this issue. Dos Lagos addressed the issue substantially in both its opening and reply 
briefs to the court. Though it has not found case law directly on point, Dos Lagos pointed 
the court of appeals to both statutory and contract law in support of its argument that 
RADC should not have been awarded a judgment for the full amount due under the loan. 
The judgment awarded to RADC is precisely the kind of windfall the deficiency 
statute is designed to prevent. RADC's judgment is subject to the yet-to-be-determined 
rights and interests of Utah First, but those rights and interests may not be legally 
recognizable, leaving RADC with a windfall. Further, RADC obtained the property 
securing the loan with a credit bid. Subtracting the value of that property from its 
proportional share of the loan leaves it with a fraction of the judgment actually due to it. 
The contracts at issue also preclude RADC from a judgment in the full amount 
due. Under the Business Loan Agreement, Dos Lagos agreed that participants in the loan 
would be an "absolute owner[]" of its interest and could independently "enforce its 
interests." In addition, the participation agreement limits RADC to $1,200,000. 
The opinion of the court of appeals contains two reversible errors, and its decision 
is entitled to no deference. This Court should therefore reverse the court of appeals and 
hold that (1) RADC's claim is not entitled to relation back under Rule 15(c) and is thus 
time barred by the statute of limitations and (2) RADC's claim, if any remains, is limited 
to its 48% interest. 
ARGU1\1ENT 
The court of appeals failed to correctly apply Utah law to its analysis of the statute 
of limitations issues in this case and improperly affirmed a judgment for 100% of the 
7 
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total amount due under a loan to a party that owns only a 48% interest in that loan. 
Specifically, the court of appeals erred in (1) concluding that RADC's claims were 
deemed to relate back to the filing of Utah Firsf s complaint under Rule 15(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure6 and (2) holding that Dos Lagos's briefing was inadequate and 
thus affirnung the district comi' s a\\:ard of 100% of the amount due on the loan to 
RADC, which has only a 48% interest in the loan. 
I. THE CO{JRT OF APPEALS ERRED "'HEN IT AFFIRl\iED THAT 
RADC'S CLA.Il\1 FOR DEFICIENCY ,VAS NOT BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIJ\flTATIONS. 
The court of appeals incorrectly affim1ed the district court's ruling that RADC' s 
claim against Dos Lagos was not barred by the statute of limitations, despite the 
undisputed fact that RADC did not file a complaint within the three months required by 
statute. The court of appeals erred, specifically, \:vhen it held that the purposes of Rule 
15(c) were met and that RADC and Utah First have an identity of interest sufficient to 
trigger the exception to Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allowing relation 
back to parties with an identity of interest. 
RADC did not file a deficiency action against Dos Lagos \:Vithin the required three 
months. The statute of limitations for an action for deficiency after the foreclosure of 
property securing a note is \,,ithin three months after the sale of the property. Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-32. This statute is a creditor's only avenue to recover any deficiency. See, 
6 If this Court ultimately finds that RADC's complaint did not relate back to the original 
complaint filed by Utah First or that RADC was not entitled to a judgment for the full 
amount due under the note, the judgment against the guarantors, Roland Neil Family 
Limited Partnership, Roland N. \\Talker, and Sally \\Talker, should be dismissed or 
modified accordingly. 
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e.g., Machock v. Fink, 2006 UT 30, ~ 22, 137 P.3d 779. In this case, the property was 
sold on December 3, 2010, making the deadline to file a deficiency action :March 3, 2011. 
While Utah First filed a complaint related to its 52% interest in the loan within the 
deadline in January 2011, RADC did not file an independent action or appear on any 
complaint against Dos Lagos until November 15, 2011, over eight months past the 
deadline, and did not add in its 48% share of the loan deficiency until September 2012. 
RADC' s deficiency action is not saved by the relation back doctrine found in Rule 
lS(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15(c) allows an amended complaint to 
"relate back" to the date of the original complaint "[ w ]henever the claim or defense 
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c) 
( emphasis added). But, by its own terms, Rule 15( c) applies only to "claims" and 
"defenses" not to parties. Indeed, Utah courts have confirmed that "[g]enerally Rule 15(c) 
... will not apply to an amendment which substitutes or adds new parties for those 
brought before the court by the original pleadings-whether plaintiff or defendant." 
Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976). 
Nor does the exception to Rule 15(c) apply to save RADC's deficiency action. 
"The exception operates where there is a relation back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, 
when new and old parties have an identity of interest; so it can be assumed or proved the 
relation back is not prejudicial." Id. The relation back doctrine "invokes a constructive 
timing fiction with respect to certain amended pleadings" and "has been interpreted to 
extend not just to the parties to the original pleading but also to those who share an 
9 
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'identity of interest' with them." VCS, Inc. v. [}tah Community Bank, 2012 UT 89, ,i 25~ 
293 P.3d 290. In this case, Utah First" s lawsuit did not constitute notice to Dos Lagos that 
RA.DC would seek a deficiency judgment, nor do Utah First and RA.CD have an identity 
of interest sufficient to trigger the exception to Rule 15( c ). 
First, the com1 of appeals erroneously held that the exception requires simply that 
a party have notice of litigation concerning a particular occurrence. 2010-1 R4.DC/CADC 
Venture, LLC v. Dos Lagos, LLC, 2016 UT App 89, ,I 12,372 P.3d 683 (citing Bald11·in 
County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 150 n.3 (1984)). The court of appeals 
noted that the amended complaint "did not assert new· claims" and "'did nothing more 
than add RADC, a successor coholder of the very note Utah First had sued upon, as a 
plaintiff." Id. Based on this, the court held that upon receipt of the first complaint, Dos 
Lagos "received sufficient notice to satisfy the rational of rule 15(c)." 7 Id. 
Dos Lagos, for obvious reasons, asserts that being on notice that one creditor 
intends to sue is substantially different from being on notice that an additional creditor 
intends to sue. As this Court has recognized, one of the purposes of the three-month time 
period is to allow the debtor to "plan accordingly." Standard Fed. Sav. And Loan Ass 'n v. 
Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1991). Creditors receive a quick remedy of 
foreclosure but then have to quickly give notice to the debtor of an intention to seek a 
deficiency, which prevents the debtor from being left in financial limbo. Id. Dos Lagos's 
7 In support of this holding, the court cited only two federal cases considering "the 
comparable federal rule." The Utah exception, in apparent contrast with the federal rule, 
does not extend to amendments that add new parties "who have no identity of interest 
with existing parties." Russell v. Standard Co,p., 898 P.2d 263,265 (Utah 1995) 
( citations omitted). 
10 
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loan agreements were all with America West Bank, succeeded in interest by RADC. And 
yet, RADC did not file a deficiency action. Dos Lagos did receive notice that Utah First, 
asserting only its 52% interest in loan via the participation agreement, sought a deficiency 
judgment, and Dos Lagos planned accordingly. But Dos Lagos was certainly not on 
notice that RADC sought a deficiency judgment. And the addition of RADC to the action 
also meant that, in addition to Utah First' s claim for its 52% of the loan proceeds, 
RADC's claim for its 48% of the loan proceeds was added. Thus, the court of appeals got 
it wrong on both counts, i.e., a claim was in fact added and notice of Utah First's claim 
was not notice to Dos Lagos ofRADC's claim. The insufficiency of the notice of an 
action from RADC is particularly apparent where, as here, the two creditors do not have 
the identity of interest contemplated by the exception. 
Second, the court of appeals erroneously held that RADC and Utah First had an 
identity of interest. An identity of interest in this context is defined as follows: 
[t]he parties are so closely related in their business operations that notice of the 
action against one serves to provide notice of the action to the other. Such an 
identity exists, for example, between past and present fom1s of the same 
enterprise. 
Peny v. Pioneer T¥holesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214,217 (Utah 1984) (citations 
omitted). However, "privity of contract alone is an insufficient identity of interest for 
relation back under rule 15(c)." Russell v. Standard Co,p., 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 
1995). 
Despite clear Utah law on the subject, the court of appeals held that "[t]here is 
perhaps no closer identity of interest than that shared by two parties who are joint holders 
11 
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of the same note." 2010-1 RADCICADC Venture, LLCv. Dos Lagos, LLC, 2016 UT App 
89, ,I 13,372 P.3d 683. In so holding, the court of appeals ignored the progeny of cases 
decided by this Court on this very issue, all of v.foch bold that mere privity of contract -
the only thing binding Utah First and RADC in this case - is not a sufficient identity of 
interest to trigger the exception. See, e.g., Peny v. Pioneer Tf'?wlesale Supply Co., 681 
P.2d 214, 217 (Utah 1984); Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263,265 (Utah 1995); 
VCS, Inc. v. Utah Community Bank, 2012 UT 89, ~ 27,293 P.3d 290. 
In PenJJ, a general contractor sued a subcontractor, Perry, for breach of contract 
related to some defective doors. Pen): v. Pioneer Tf'7iolesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 
(Utah 1984 ). Almost three years later, after the statute of limitations had expired, Perry 
attempted to have its third-party complaint against the door supplier relate back to the 
filing of the original action. Id. at 217. This Court rejected that approach and held that 
where there was "no evidence showing any identity of interest between the [parties] other 
than privity of contract," the identity of interest was insufficient for the purpose of Rule 
l 5(c). Id. 
Likewise, in Russell, the plaintiff sued The Associated Press and The Salt Lake 
Tribune for alleged defamatory remarks contained in an article originally published by 
the Ogden Standard Examiner. Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995). The 
plaintiff later sought to use Rule 15(c) to have her tardy claim against Standard relate 
back to the date of her original complaint. Id. at 265. Though the ne\\'S organizations all 
published the article and had contracts among themselves, this Court declined to allow 
the relation back, holding that "privity of contract alone is an insufficient identity of 
12 
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interest for relation back under rule 15(c)." Id. 
In VCS, Inc. v. Utah Community Bank, this Court more recently considered the 
question of the exception to the relation back doctrine permitting the relation back of an 
amended complaint adding a party where the party has an identity of interest. 2012 UT 
89, 293 P.3d 290. VCS, a contractor, filed suit against the developer for lack of payment. 
VCS later argued that its tardy complaint against the financing bank should relate back to 
its original complaint against the developer. Again, this Court rejected the argument and 
held that VSC "fails to establish ... that [the two defendants] share an 'identity of 
interest' and thus the relation back doctrine cannot excuse its failure to join [the second 
defendant] within the timeframe required by statute." Id. The court further emphasized 
that "[o]urprecedent accordingly forecloses VCS's assertion that [the two defendants] 
shared an identity of interest based on their contractual relationship. Id. 
Like the parties in Peny, Russell, and VCS, the only tie between RADC and Utah 
First, in this case, is their contractual relationship as defined in the participation 
agreement, i.e., their privity of contract. Under Utah law, that privity of contract is not an 
identity of interest sufficient to trigger the relation back doctrine in Rule 15(c). Nor do 
RADC and Utah First have any other markers of an identity of interest. They are not so 
closely related in their business operations that notice of the action against one serves to 
provide notice of the action to the other. In fact, Utah First and RADC are separate and 
distinct entities with separate and distinct interests and have no related business 
operations. They obtained their interests in the note at issue in two different ways, as 
shown in the chart below. 
13 
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FDIC 
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> 
, ..... 
< 
R..A..DC 
48% 
l,, I i 
" 
,;.:;;,>43 I 
This lack of an identity of interest becomes even clearer when considering the 
posture of each enfay on summary judgment. The district court denied Utah First's 
motion for summary judgment, while granting RADC's motion for summary judgment. 
(R. 826-838.) If these two entities had an identity of interests, they would have been in 
the same or similar position on the motions for summary judgment. And yet, they were 
not. The facts related to the positions of Utah First and RADC even in relation to the 
same note were different and concluded with different legal results. The district court 
appropriately treated the two entities and their claims as separate, and the court of appeals 
should have determined that they did not have an identity of interest sufficient to trigger 
the exception to the relation back doctrine in Rule IS(c). Its failure to do so resulted in 
prejudice to Dos Lagos. 
14 
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Finally, Utah law and public policy dictate that procedural rules should not 
override clear statutory requirements. In Donjuan v. A1cDermott, this Court considered 
the application of the Rule 15 relation back doctrine in the context of the strict statutory 
scheme for adoptions. 2011 UT 72, 266 P.3d 839. This Court held that Rule 15 did not 
operate to save the father's claim because he failed to comply with the statutory 
requirements: "[o]ur general rules of procedure cannot obviate such explicit statutory 
requirements." Id. at ,116. Similarly, the relation back doctrine in Rule 15 cannot operate 
here to relieve RADC of its strict and explicit statutory requirement to file a deficiency 
action within the three month statute of limitation, particularly where RADC and Utah 
First lack an identity of interest. 8 
This Court should reverse the court of appeals and hold that RADC and Utah First 
lacked an identity of interest sufficient to trigger the exception to Rule 15( c) and that 
RADC's complaint was untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ,VHEN IT AFFIR.l\IBD THA..T RA.DC 
\VAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT OF 100% OF THE Al\1OUNT DUE. 
Even if this Court determines that RADC's claims were timely, the court of 
appeals erroneously held that RADC was entitled to a judgment that included 100% of 
the amount due on the loan, despite RADC's 48% interest in the loan and acquisition of 
the property securing the loan. Rather than determine this question on its merits, the court 
8 The court of appeals also noted that "as a policy matter, cases such as this one should be 
decided in a single action." 2010-1 RADCICADC Venture, LLC, 2016 UT App 89 at ,114 
(citations omitted). Dos Lagos does not dispute that policy but does dispute that such a 
policy can or should relieve one or more of the parties from the applicable statute of 
limitations requirements. 
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of appeals decided not to reach the issue: 
Appellants complain that the district court's order, making the judgment subject to 
any subsequently determined interest of Utah First, "cited no law." But after 
registering this complaint, Appellants direct this court to no statute, case, or other 
authority that supports their contention that the district court got this wrong. 
Appellants' failure to carry their burden of persuasion on appeal is a sufficient 
ground for us to reject this argument. See Hi-Country Estates Homeov,,ners Ass 'n 
v. Jesse Rodney Dansie Living Trust, 2015 UT App 281, 18,359 P.3d 655. 
2010-1 RADCICADC Venture, LLC v. Dos Lagos, LLC, 2016 UT App 89, ~ 21,372 P.3d 
683. 
This Court has declared that "[f]ailure to provide any analysis or legal authority 
constitutes inadequate briefing." Coleman ex rel. Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ii 7, 17 
P.3d 1122 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Dos Lagos's briefing on this issue was not inadequate. In its opening brief to the 
court of appeals, Dos Lagos dedicated over nvo full pages to this argument and provided 
both analysis and legal authority to support its argument. 9 Though, admittedly, Dos 
Lagos could not (and still has not) found legal authority directly on point, it argued in its 
opening brief that allowing RA.DC to collect 100% of a note, of which it owns only 48%, 
is precisely the kind of ,,,indfall the deficiency statute is trying to prevent. 10 
RA.DC purchased America \Vest Bank's interest in 48% of the loan at issue. After 
granting summary judgment to R.ADC and denying summary judgment to Utah First, the 
district court awarded RA.DC a judgment for 100% of the amount due under the note, 
9 The relevant excerpt of Petitioner's opening brief to the court of appeals is attached 
hereto as Addendum E. 
10 RA.DC' s brief to the court of appeals addressed this issue in just under two pages and 
only cited the Loan Agreement between America \Vest Bank and Dos Lagos, the 
Commercial Guaranties, and the district court's ruling. 
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"subject to any subsequently determined interest of Utah First Federal Credit Union." (R. 
836 n. 7.) The problem with this approach is that such a judgment gives RADC immediate 
leave to collect on that judgment, which it has done. And yet, if, at some point in the 
future, Utah First is determined to not have any legally cognizable interest in the loan, 
RADC will be left with a windfall. 
Further, RADC acquired the foreclosed property, which was worth $1,510,000.00. 
With a total amount due under the note of $3,426,701.91, RADC's 48% share of that is 
$1,644,816.92. Subtracting the value of the foreclosed property from RADC's share, 
RADC is left with just $134,816.92 owed to it. And yet, the district court awarded it a 
judgment of almost $3 million. Allowing RADC to retain a judgment for the full amount 
is not only unjust, inequitable, and subject to the legal issues discussed herein but is also 
a slippery slope and dangerous precedent to set for other participating creditors. 
The court of appeals noted that "it would be unjust to allow debtors to avoid 
responsibility for a substantial portion of their obligations simply because one of two 
creditors on a single debt takes the laboring oar in collecting the debt." 2010-1 
RA.DC/CADC Venture, LLC v. Dos Lagos, LLC, 2016 UT App 89, iJ 22, 372 P.3d 683. 
That statement is inapplicable here. RADC did not take "the laboring oar" in collecting 
the debt, and Utah First and RADC are not "joint owners." They have distinct interests in 
the note, and Utah First brought the only timely action under the note. RADC was then 
improperly allowed to join the action. RADC \Vas successful in its claims, and Utah First 
was not. It is not equitable then, to bestow a windfall on RADC when it received the 
foreclosed property and its claims extend only to 48% of the amount due on the loan. 
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In its reply brief to the court of appeals, Dos Lagos dedicated over three pages to 
this very issue, this time focusing its argument on Utah contract law and the contracts 
among the parties: the Loan Agreement, the Commercial Guaranties, and the 
Participation Agreement. 11 
RA.DC is entitled only to its 48% interest in the loan. In the Business Loan 
Agreement, executed by America \Vest Bank and Dos Lagos, Dos Lagos agreed to the 
following provision on loan participation: 
Consent to Loan Participation. Borrower agrees and consents to Lender's sale or 
transfer, whether now or later, of one or more participation interests in the Loan to 
one or more purchasers, whether related or unrelated to Lender. Lender may 
provide, without any limitation whatsoever, to any one or more purchasers, or 
potential purchases, any information or knmvledge Lender may have about 
Borrower or about any other matter relating to the Loan, and Borrower hereby 
waives any rights to privacy Borrower may have with respect to such matters. 
Borrower also agrees that the purchasers of anv such participation interests will be 
considered as the absolute owners of such interest in the Loan and will have all the 
rights granted under the participation agreement or agreements governing the sale 
of such participation interests. Borrower further waives all rights of offset or 
counterclaim that it may have now or later against Lender or against any purchaser 
of such a participation interest and unconditionally agrees that either Lender or 
such purchaser may enforce Borrower's obligation under the Loan irrespective of 
the failure or insolvency of any holder of any interest in the Loan. Borrower 
further agrees that the purchaser of anv such participation interests mav enforce its 
interests irrespective of any personal claims or defenses that Borrov:,rer may have 
a2:ainst Lender. 
(R. 771 (emphasis added).) Everything in this provision indicates that a participation 
agreement cleaves the interests of the paiticipants. A participant is the "absolute owner[]" 
of its interest and may independently "enforce its interests." And, of course, as the drafter 
of this agreement, any ambiguities are construed against America \Vest Bank and its 
11 The relevant excerpt of Petitioner's opening brief to the court of appeals is attached 
hereto as Addendum E. 
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successor, R..ADC. See, e.g., Express Recove1y Servs., Inc. v. Rice, 2005 UT App 495, ,r 3, 
125 P.3d 108. 
R..ADC could sell and assign its 48% interest in the loan, as it bought it. It could 
not, however, sell or assign Utah First's 52% interest. R..ADC's property rights extend 
only to its share of the note, according to both contract law and property law. Further, the 
participation agreement limits American \Vest Bank's (and therefore R..ADC's) 
participation to "$1,200,000.00." (R. 556.) The district court's judgment grants R..ADC 
the right to collect far more than $1,200,000. 
Dos Lagos adequately briefed this issue before the court of appeals. Though Dos 
Lagos ( as well as R..ADC, the district court, and the court of appeals) has not found legal 
authority on this issue, both the statute and the contract governing the parties indicates 
that the judgment should have been limited to R..ADC's 48% interest. 
This court should therefore reverse the holding of the court of appeals and hold 
that Dos Lagos's briefing on this issue was adequate and that R..ADC is entitled to only its 
pro rata share of the loan. 
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CONCLUSION 
Therefore, Petitioners respectfully request that this Court reverse the court of 
appeals, set aside RADC's judgments, and award Petitioners their attorneys' fees and 
costs pursuant to both statute and the contracts at issue in this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUB1v1ITTED this 21st day of September 2016. 
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Opinion 
No. 20140675-CA 
Filed April 28, 2016 
Second District Court, Farmington Department 
The Honorable John R. Morris 
No. 110700200 
Clifford V. Dunn, Michael C. Dunn, Evan A. 
Schmutz, and Jordan K. Cameron, Attorneys 
for Appellants 
Richard C. Terry and Jeremiah R. Taylor, Attorneys 
for A ppellee 
APR 2 8 2016 
JUDGE GREGORY K. 01Th1E authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES 
1v1ICHELEM. CHRlSTIANSEN and KATE A. TOOMEY concurred.1 
ORM:E, Judge: 
il Tius appeal comes to us from the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, 
1. Judge James Z. Davis heard the arguments in this case but did 
not have the opportunity to vote on this Opinion prior to his 
death. See State v. Goins, 2016 UT App 57, n.l. Judge Kate A. 
Toomey substituted for Judge Davis and, having revie,,ved the 
briefs and listened to the oral arguments, participated fully in 
the court's resolution of this appeal. 
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1010-1 R .. 1DC!CADC Venture, LLC v. Dos Lagos, LLC 
LLC (RADC). Appellants challenge the summary judgment on a 
number of grounds. V\7 e c11fir111.. 
BACKGROUNTI 
i2 The pertinent facts of this case are undisputed. In 2007, 
Appellants Dos Lagos, LLC, and Mellon Valley, LLC, 
(Borrmvers) received a $2.5 million loan from America Vv est 
Bank. The loan ,-vas personally guaranteed by Appellants Rolar1d 
N. \,\Talker, Sallv VValker, and the Roland Neil Familv Limited 
., ., 
Partnership (the Guarantors). Later that year, America '\Vest 
entered into a loan participation agreement ,,vith Utah First 
Federal Credit Union, \'\7hereby Utah First obtained a fifty-tv-rn 
percent interest in the loan and America West retained a forty-
ejght percent interest. 
c_JI3 One year later, on December 5, 2008, Borrm-'\rers executed 
a Change in Terms Agreement, which, among other things, 
extended their promissory note (the Note) with America \Vest. 
The Note was secured by real property m,vned by Mellon Valley 
(the Property). 
i4 Tne FDIC ultimately closed America '\Vest and seized 
America V\Test's interest in the Note, ,.vhich it thereafter sold to 
RADC at auction. BorrO"wers defaulted on the Note and received 
multiple letters notifying them of the default and requesting 
payment. In December 2010, RADC purchased the Property-
which was valued at $1,510,000-at a trustee's sale for 
$1,060,000. At the time of the sale, the total amount m-ving on the 
Note was $3,426,701.91, leaving a deficiency of $1,916,701.91 
ben-veen the amount m•ved and the value of the Property. Utah 
First, whose interest in the Note had not been affected by 
America 1N est' s demise and the transfer of its interest, filed an 
action seeking a deficiency judgment the next month. 
<]15 In its original Complaint, Utah First 1,vas the only named 
plaintiff and it erroneously indicated that the total amount m-ved 
20140675-CA 2 2016 UT App 89 
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2010-1 RADCICADC Venture, LLC v. Dos Lagos, LLC 
on the Note was just $1,819,774.97.2 Dos Lagos filed a motion to 
dismiss, in part because RADC ,,..ras not included as a party. The 
parties stipulated to allow amendment, and the First Amended 
Complaint added RADC as a plaintiff. It did not, however, 
correct the amount owed. Utah First and R.A.DC sought leave to 
amend again and filed the Second Amended Complaint in 
September 2012, alleging the amount due as the full 
$3,426,701.91. 
<JI 6 RADC and Utah First filed motions for summary 
judgment, seeking a deficiency of $1,916,701.91. Borrowers 
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for 
summary judgment. The district court denied Utah First' s 
motion for summary judgment, determining that there were 
issues of fact surrounding the validity of the loan participation 
agreement that had been executed by Utah First and America 
West. But it granted RADC s motion for summary judgment 
against Borrowers, awarding RADC a deficiency judgment, 
calculated as the difference beh-veen the full amount due under 
the Note and the value of the property at the time of its sale to 
RADC, see Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (LexisNexis 2010), subject 
to any subsequently determined interest of Utah First. The 
district court denied Borrm,vers' motion to dismiss and motion 
for summary judgment. 
<JI7 Shortly thereafter, RADC moved for summary judgment 
against the Guarantors on the ground that judgment had been 
awarded against Borrowers on the obligation guaranteed by the 
Guarantors. The district court granted the motion, and 
2. RADC suggests that this amount represented Utah First1 s 
fifty-tvvo percent interest in the total amount owed on the Note. 
But by our math, fifty-tvvo percent of $3,426,701.91 is 
$1,781,884.99. 
20140675-CA 3 2016 UT App 89 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2010-1 RADCICADC Venture, LLC v. Dos Lagos, LLC 
Borrm,vers and the Guarantors (collectively, Appellants) now 
appeal.3 
ISSUES ANTI STANDARD OF REVIEVV 
CjJ:8 Appellants first argue that RA.DC' s claim did not relate 
back to G11e original Complaint and ,,vas therefore barred by the 
statute of limitations. They next contend that the district court 
erred by a,varding RA.DC the full amount due under the Note 
rather than just its pro rata share. Finally, Appellants claim that 
it '"ras error for the district court to grant summary judgment 
against t.1-ie Guarantors. All of the issues raised involve -t'-le 
district court's interpretation and application of the lalv in 
granting summary judgment. "[V\i]e review the [ district] court's 
legal conclusions for correctness, affording those legal 
conclusions no deference." Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, 'JI 15, 44 
P.3d 781. 
ANALYSIS 
I. RADC's Claim Vvas Not Time-Barred. 
19 The resolution of Appellant's primary argument on 
appeal depends on the operation of the applicable statute of 
limitations. Section 57-1-32 of the Utah Code requires that "an 
action ... to recover the balance due upon [an] obligation for 
which [a] trust deed was given as security" must be commenced 
11
•Nithin three months after any sale of property under a trust 
deed." See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (LexisNexis 2010). 
Appellants argue that because RADC did not commence an 
action against Borrm,vers ,,vithin three months of the trustee's 
3. Utah First moved to voluntarily dismiss its claims \'\7ithout 
prejudice, which the district court allmved over Borrowers' 
objection. Utah First is therefore not a party to this appeal. 
20140675-CA 4 2016 UT App 89 
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2010-1 RADCICADC Venture, LLC v. Dos Lagos, LLC 
sale, its claim was barred before it joined the action via the First 
Amended Complaint.4 
<J[lO There is no dispute that RADC v,.ras not identified as a 
plaintiff in any complaint filed against Borrowers vdthin three 
months of the trustee's sale. There is also no dispute that Utah 
First' s original Complaint was filed within that three-month 
·window. vVhat we must determine, then, is whether the original 
Complaint operates to satisfy the three-month requirement for 
RADC as well as for Utal1 First. 
'Illl Appellants contend that the First Amended Complaint 
impermissibly added a party to the proceeding in violation of 
the applicable statute of limitations. Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure allows an amended complaint to "relate[] 
back to the date of the original pleading" if "the claim 
... asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in 
the original pleading.,, Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c). Relying on the Utah 
Supreme Court's opinion in Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 
902 (Utah 1976), Appellants argue that this rule generally does 
"not apply to an amendment which substitutes or adds new 
parties ... whether plaintiff or defendant.'' See id. at 906. 
4. Appellants also take issue ,,vith the district court's alternate 
conclusion that "even if the claims of RADC do not relate back to 
the original filing of the complaint, because the purposes of Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-32 have been satisfied, RADC's failure to 
comply with the statute did not constitute an absolute bar to the 
suit." Because we conclude that RADC's claim does relate back to 
the filing of the original Complaint, ,,ve need not consider the 
propriety of this alternate ruling. See generally Weber v. Snyderville 
l.Vest, 800 P.2d 316, 320 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("We may affirm the 
trial court on any proper ground."). 
20140675-CA 5 2016 UT App 89 
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Cj112 Of course, there are exceptions to this general rule. The 
principal exception is articulated in Sulzen v. ,villiams, 1999 UT 
App 76, 977 P.2d 497, where this court stated: 
[\\T]hile generally Rule 15( c) ... vdll not apply to an 
amendment ,-vhlch substitutes or adds ne,"1 parties 
for those brought before the court by the original 
pleadings, [Lhe Utah Supreme Court has] made an 
exception to the general rule. The exception 
operates "'"rhere there is a relation back, as to both 
plaintiff and defendant, ,,vhen ne·w and old parties 
have an identity of interest; so it can be assumed or 
proved the relation back is not prejudicial. 
Id. CJ[ 14 (alterations and omission in original) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 0 The rationale of Rule 15(c) is 
that a party ,,vho has been notified of litigation concerning a 
particular occurrence has been given all the notice that statutes 
of limitations ,-vere intended to provide." Baldwin County 
Vvelcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 150 n.3 (1984) (considering 
the comparable federal rule). "The same general standard of 
notice applies regardless of ,,vhether a litigant seeks to add 
defendants, plaintiffs, or claims." lvf.cClelland v. Deluxe Fin. Sen,s., 
Inc., 431 F. App'x 718, 723-24 (10th Cir. 2011) (considering the 
comparable federal rule). Here, the First Amended Complaint 
did nothing more than add RADC, a successor coholder of the 
very note Utah First had sued upon, as a plaintiff. It did not 
assert new claims. It therefore follows that vlhen Utah First filed 
the original Complaint, seeking the deficiency ben-veen the 
amount owed on the Note and the value of the Property 
purchased by RADC at the trustee's sale, Borrowers received 
sufficient notice to satisfy the rationale of rule 15( c). 
':[13 The sufficiency of the notice to Borrn·Ners is further 
dernonsh·ated by the identity of interest between Utah First and 
RADC. The cases cited by Appellants in relation to this point are 
unhelpful, as they address a frame,;vork that is inapplicable to 
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the facts of this case. For instance, Appellants suggest that 
because "RADC and Utah First are tvvo separate and distinct 
entities," there can be no relation back. \I've acknov,rledge that it is 
often necessai-y to look at the connection betvveen the business 
operations of the original and added parties, see Russell v. 
Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 1995), but that factor 
alone is insufficient to resolve an identity-of-interest question. 
Vve cannot ignore the fact that although there is no direct 
business or ongoing contractual relationship ben,veen Utah First 
and RADC, this case centers around one debt, one promissory 
note, and one trustee's sale. In very simple terms, there is but one 
"conduct, transaction, or occurrence" on which all claims are 
based. See Utah R. Civ. P. lS(c). There is perhaps no closer 
identity of interest than that shared by n-vo parties who are joint 
holders of the same note. See generally Penrose v. Ross, 2003 UT 
App 157, <JI 16, 71 P.3d 631 ("[A]n identity of interest requires 
parties to have the' same' interest. 11). 
<]114 We also point out that as a policy matter, cases such as 
this one should be decided in a single action. Cf Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-6-901(1) (LexisNexis 2012) ("There is only one action for 
the recovery of any debt, or the enforcement of any right, 
secured solely by mortgage upon real estate and that action shall 
be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter."). So long 
as the rights of the parties are protected and the rules of law are 
followed - ,,vhich they were here by the notice given to 
Borrowers via the initial Complaint and by the identity of 
interest betvveen RADC and Utah First-our judicial system 
values judicial economy. See Okelbetry v. West Daniels Land Ass'n, 
2005 UT App 327, <JI 11, 120 P.3d 34. By allovring the 
amendments to the original Complaint, the district court 
furthered this objective. 
II. It Was Not Error for the District Court to A ward RADC the 
Full Deficiency Amount. 
CJl15 Appellants next challenge two aspects of the district 
court's order concerning the amount of the judgment. First, they 
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argue that the district court should not have a'"'arded judgment 
ir1 the ai."ttount sought by the Second Amended Complaint-the 
full deficiency amount-but should instead have limited any 
judgment to a sum calculated vvith reference to the amount 
claimed to be due in the original Complaint. Second, Appellants 
argue that it was error to a,,vard the entire deficiency judgment 
amount to RADC, even though the district court expressly made 
that judgment subject to any later-determined interest of Utah 
First. \1\Te conclude that the district court did not err in either 
regard. 
A. Plaintiffs Vvere Entitled to Recover the Full Deficiency 
Amount. 
ci116 The original Complaint claimed that the total amount still 
due on the Note '"'as $1,819,774.97. The First Amended 
Complaint, ,vhich added RADC as a plaintiff, left that amount 
unchanged. Finally, in the Second Amended Complaint, the 
amount due on the Note was updated to correct the full ru-nount 
actually due on the Note and to state the amount still due 
following the sale of the land securing the Note-$1,916,701.91. 
"\\Then Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, they sought a 
deficiency judgment in this amount. 
<j[17 Appellants point to the language of section 57-1-32 to 
argue that Plaintiffs v,.reie limited to pursuing the amount 
Lldicated in the original Complaint. Specifically, the statute 
mandates that uthe complaint shall set forth the entire amount of 
the indebtedness." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (LexisNexis 2010). 
The question before us, as Appellants state it, is vdtether, based 
on that language, RADC "should have been estopped from 
arguing that the amount O'\•VLrtg ,vas more than ,-vhat ,,vas 
originally plead[ed]." 
i18 A successful claim of estoppel '\".1ould require, among 
other things, a shm"•ing that Appellants took reasonable action-
or reasonably refrained from action-based on the misstatement 
of the amount of indebtedness included in the original 
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Complaint. See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 
UT 33, CJ[ 41, 258 P.3d 539. According to Appellants, without 
citation to any portion of the record, "[Borrowers] did not 
engage in a trial and negotiation strategy that they would or 
could have employed had the total amount due under the note 
been originally asserted as the same amount as ultimately 
claimed." This is not the sort of inaction that is contemplated by 
the doctrine of estoppel. 
119 But even if Appellants might have acted differently in the 
months following the filing of the original Complaint had it 
included the amount actually due, the Second Amended 
Complaint was filed in September 2012. The district court did 
not grant RADC' s motion for summary judgment until April 
2013. Thus, even ignoring the fact that Borrm~rers likely always 
knew-and surely should have knovvn-the full amount mved 
under the Note, they had seven months benveen the filing of the 
Second Amended Complaint and the district court's order 
during which they could have "engage[d] in a [different] trial 
and negotiation strategy" when confronted with the increased 
amount, if so inclined. Because they did not do so then, there is 
no reason to assume they would have done so earlier. It was 
therefore not error for the district court to enter judgment based 
on the amount alleged in the Second Amended Complaint once 
that amount was proven. 
B. It V'vas Not Error for RADC to Receive Judgment Based on 
the Full Amount Due on the Note. 
<jf20 RADC had only a forty-eight percent interest in the Note, 
but the district court awarded the entire deficiency amount to 
RADC, albeit subject to any subsequently determined interest of 
Utah First. We acknov\Tledge that, at first glance, it might appear 
that Appellants make a compelling argument. After all, it seems 
somewhat intuitive that as a forty-eight percent owner of the 
Note, RADC should have received judgment for only forty-eight 
percent of the amount still owing on the Nate. 
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1[21 Appellants complain that the district court's order, 
making the judgment subject to any subsequently determined 
interest of Utah First, "cited no law." But after registering this 
complaint, Appellants direct this court to no statute, case, or 
other authority that supports their contention that the district 
court got this ,-vrong. Appellants' failure to carry their burden of 
persuasion on appeal is a sufficient ground for us to reject this 
argument. See Hi-Country Estates Hom.eowners Ass'n v. Jesse 
Rodney Dansie Living Trust, 2015 UT App 218, '.II 8, 359 P.3d 655. 
CJ122 \Ve do briefly note, however, that it v•muld be unjust to 
allm•v debtors to avoid responsibility for a substantial portion of 
their obligations simply because one of tvm creditors on a single 
debt takes the laboring oar in collecting the debt.5 See, e.g., Irons 
v. American Nat'l Bank, 172 S.E. 629, 641 (Ga. 1933) (" Any one of 
the holders may foreclose, giving the notice required by lav~" to 
all holders concerned."); Zalesk v. 11\iolanski, 281 Ill. App. 54, 55 
(1935) (determining that "the plaintiff., as one of the note holders, 
under the terms of the trust deed, had the right to declare the 
,,vhole amount of the indebtedness due and unpaid11 ). The 
district court determin.ed that Borrowers m-ved $1,916,701.91 
under the Note. Hm,v that am.aunt is divided behveen RADC 
and Utah First is no business of Borrowers, provided that they 
are the only hvo holders of the Note and the judgment 
represents the total amount properly due under the Note. There 
is no dispute that the amount a,,varded by summary judgment is 
the total amount owed, and the qualifying language of the 
judgment recognizes the possible interest of Utah First and 
5. Of course, the creditor who obtains a judgment would then 
have to account to the other creditor for its interest in the note or 
other instrument. Cf Joseph Nelson Supply Co. v. Leary, 164 P. 
1047, 1049 (Utah 1917) ("[A] person ,,vho claims the contract 
price, in whole or in part, ,-vhich is due to the contractor ... , 
takes the assignment subject to the claims for labor performed 
and material furnished to the contractor, 1-vhich was by him used 
in the performance of his contract[.]"). 
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protects Appellants from having to pay the debt hvice-once to 
RADC and once to Utah First. 
III. Summary Judgment Against the Guarantors \t\Till Not Be 
Disturbed. 
<J[23 Finally, Appellants contend that the district court erred by 
granting summary judgment against the Guarantors. 
Appellants' straightforward argument is that judgment was 
improperly granted against Borrowers on the underlying 
obligation and so the judgment against the Guarantors is 
lil<ewise invalid. Appellants recognize that their arguments on 
behalf of the Guarantors rise or fall with their arguments on 
behalf of Borrm,vers, arguing that "if the judgment that forms the 
basis of the judgment against the guarantors is overturned, then 
the judgment again.st guarantors must also be overturned." 
Because we have declined to disturb the judgment against 
Borrowers, we have no occasion to disturb the judgment against 
the Guarantors. 
CONCLUSION 
<][24 "V\7 e reject Appellants' arguments on appeal. RADC was 
properly added as a plaintiff to the case in the First Amended 
Complaint because that amendment relates back to the original 
Complaint. The district court did not err by awarding judgment 
for the entire deficiency amount or by awarding that full amount 
to RADC, subject, of course, to its obligation to account to Utah 
First for its share of any proceeds recovered. Fmally, Appellants 
have not demonstrated any reason lvhy the judgment against the 
Guarantors should be disturbed. 
Affirmed. 
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DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DA VIS COUNTY 
FARl\.1INGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH FIRST FEDERAL CREDIT 
UNION. and 2010-1 RADC/CADC 
VENTURE, LLC, as successors in interest 
to AMERICA WEST BANK, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOS LAGOS, LLC, MELLON VALLEY, 
LLC, ROLAND NEIL FAMILY 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ROLAND 
N. WALKER, and SALLY WALKER, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS 
Case No. 110700200 
Judge John R. Morris 
This matter is before the Court on (1) Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Summary 
Judgment, (2) Defendants• Motion to Dismiss the Claims of Plaintiff2010-1 RADC/CADC 
Venture, LLC, and (3) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative 
Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance. The Court has reviewed the moving and responding 
papers, along with their supporting materials, and its case file. The Court also held a hearing 
on the matters on February 25, 2013. Having considered all of the arguments, being fully 
advised in the premises, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court rules as follows: 
ANALYSIS 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories. and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "On a motion for summary judgment, a trial 
court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material 
issues of fact exist[,]" so as to determine if judgment may be rendered as a matter of law. 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P .2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995). 
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Here, Plaintiffs seeks summary judgment on their claims for deficiency judgment and 
unjust enrichment. 1 In support of their motion, Plaintiffs assert the following material facts,2 
which Defendants have not disputed: 
1) Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC entered into a Business 
Loan Agreement with America West Bank in 2007. 
2) On December 6, 2007, America West Bank entered into a loan Partic-
ipation Agreement with Utah First Federal Credit Union, wherein 
America West Bank retained an undivided 48% interest in the loan 
and Utah First Federal Credit Union obtained an undivided 52% in• 
terest in the loan. 
3) On December S, 2008, Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC exe-
cuted a Change in Terms Agreement, which restated, modified and ex-
tended their Promissory Nate with America West Bank dated March 
29, 2007, with a principal amount of $2,500,000.00. 
4) The Promissory Note was secured by real property owned by Mellon 
Valley, LLC located in Hurricane, Washington County, Utah. 
5) The Revolving Credit Deed of Trust on the real property securing the 
Promissory Note named America West Bank as beneficiary and trus-
tee. 
6) On May I, 2009. the FDIC closed America West Bank and seized its 
interest in the Promissory Note. 
7) Between May and December 2009, the FDIC sent Defendants multi-
ple letters notifying them that their loan with America West Bank was 
in default, and requesting payment 
8) On November 23, 2009, a Notice of Default under the Revolving 
Credit Deed of Trust was recorded at the Washington County Record-
er's Office. 
'While Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint includes claims for Breach of Real Property Note and Breach 
of Guarantees, these claims seek to recover a deficiency following a trustee's sale of real property that secured 
a promissory note. Accordingly, the Court shall construe Plaintiffs' claims for Breach of Real Property Note 
and Breach of Guarantees as actions for deficiency judgment under Utah Code Ann.§ 57•1-32. 
i To support their statement of undisputed material facts, Plaintiffs submitted the Amended Affidavit of Paul 
Toller, the Senior Vice President of Utah First Federal Credit Union, which attached copies of relevant do:::u• 
mentation. 
-2-
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9) The Notice of Default identified Marlon L. Bates as the successor trus• 
tee and indicated that the trustee elected to sell the trust property to 
satisfy the delinquent obligations. 
10) In 2010, the FDIC auctioned and sold America West Bank's interest in 
the loan to Plaintiff 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC. 
11) The FDIC subsequently assigned and transferred the Revolving Credit 
Deed of Trust to 2010.1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC effective Au• 
gust 26, 2010, and recorded the assignment at the Washington County 
Recorder's Office on October 26, 2010. 
12) On September 21, 2010, Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC 
were informed via letter that their loan had been transferred from 
America West Bank and that Cohen Financial was its new servicer, 
acting as an agent for 2010.1 RADC/CADCVenture, LLC. 
13) On October 27, 2010, a Notice of Trustee's Sale was sent to Mellon 
Valley, LLC via certified mail, but was returned undeliverable. 
14) The Notice of Trustee's Sale was also posted at the property securing 
the Promissory Note and published in a newspaper of general circula-
tion in Washington County, Utah. 
15) On December 3, 2010, a Substitution of Trustee was recorded at the 
Washington County Recorder's Office naming Marlon L. Bates as the 
successor trustee under the Revolving Credit Deed of Trust. 
16) On December 6, 2010, the property securing the Promissory Note was 
sold at trustee's sale for $1,060,000.00 to the highest bidder, 2010.1 
RADC/CADC Venture, LLC. 
17) The value of the property securing the Promissory Note was 
$1,510,000.00 at the time of the December 6, 2010 trustee's sale. 
18) On December 6, 2010, the outstanding payoff balance on the Revolv• 
ing Credit Deed of Trust was $3,426,701.91. 
19) On January 14, 2011, Utah First Federal Credit Union commenced 
this action. 
20) On April 29, 2011, a Special Warranty Deed conveying the property 
securing the Promissory Note to 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC 
was executed. 
-3-
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Plaintiffs maintain that these undisputed material facts entitle them to judgment against De-
fendants for the deficiency on the entire amount of indebtedness, Slt916,701.91, as a matter 
oflaw.3 
Defendants have opposed Plaintiffs' amended motion for summary judgment and 
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment arguing that they were not party to any contract 
with Utah First Federal Credit Union. Defendants further argue that Utah First Federal 
Credit Union has no right to enforce the Promissory Note. as its Participation Agreement 
with America West Bank violates state and federal credit union laws and is void for public 
policy since no Defendants were members of Utah First Federal Credit Union. As to 2010-1 
RADC/CADC Venture, LLC, Defendants argue that the three-month statute oflimitations 
for deficiency actions bars its claims.4 Alternatively, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should 
~ 
be estopped from recovering the entire amount of deficiency, as it was not pled in their orig-
inal complaint, and that additional time for discovery is necessary regarding the charter of 
Utah First Federal Credit Union, its membership guidelines, its participation in loans with 
non-members, and its agreement with America West Bank. 
L The undisputed material facts establish each of the requirements for 
rendering a defideocy judgment against Dos Lagos, LLC and 
Mellon Valley, LLC pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-32. 
The Utah Code provides that "[a]t any time within three months after any sale of 
property under a trust deed as provided in Sections 57-1•23. 57-1-24, and 57•1•27, an action 
may be commenced to recover the balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed 
was given as security, and in that action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of 
' While Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint includes claims against Roland Neil Family Limited Partner• 
ship, Roland N. Walker. and Sally Walker for guaranteeing any indebtedness of Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon 
Valley, !LC to America West Bank, Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment does not include 
any mrements of material fact relating to the existence of a guarantee. Accordingly, the Court constrUes Plain· 
tiffs' motion as pertaining only to their claims against Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC. 
' The statute of limitations argument Defendants raise in their opposition to Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for 
Summary Judgment is also the sole argument raised in Defendants• Motion to Dismiss the Claims of Plaintiff 
2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC. 
-4-
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the indebtedness that was secured by the trust deed, the amount for which the property was 
sold. and the fair market value of the property at the date of sale." Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-
32. "Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value of the property at 
the date of sale. 0 Id. "The court may not render judgment for more than the amount by 
which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including 
trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of 
the sale." Id. 
The undisputed material facts in this matter establish that the entire amount of the 
indebtedness on the Revolving Credit Deed of Trust at the date of the trustee's sale was 
$3,426,701.91, that the property sold at the trustee's sale for $1,060,000.00, and that the fair 
market value of the property at the time of the trustee's sale was $1,510,000.00. From these 
undisputed material facts the Court concludes as a matter of law that Plaintiffs have com-
plied with the requirements of the Utah deficiency statute and are entitled to judgment in 
the amount of the deficiency, $1,916,701.91, absent application of one of the defenses or ar-
guments raised by Defendants. 
II. That Defendants were not party to the Participation Agreement is 
immaterial to Plaintiffs' claims; however, genuine issues of material 
fact preclude snrnrnary judgment on Utah First Federal Credit Un-
ion's claims. 
The first defenses raised by Defendants are that Utah First Federal Credit Union 
cannot seek remedy for Defendants' breach of the Revolving Credit Deed of Trust, as De-
fendants were not party to its Participation Agreement with America West Bank. Defend-
ants also argue that the Participation Agreement violates state and federal credit union laws 
and is void for public policy, as no Defendants were members of Utah First Federal Credit 
Union prior to the entry of the Participation Agreement. The Court finds that Defendants' 
arguments are without merit. By the plain language of the Business Loan Agreement that 
Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC entered with America West Bank, Dos Lagos, 
LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC agreed that America West Bank could sell or transfer partici-
-5-
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pation interests in the loan to third parties, such as Utah First Federal Credit Union, with-
out notice or obligation to notify the borrowers. See Business Loan Agreement, pg. 4, ,i Mis-
cellaneous Provisions, Consent to Loan Participation. Accordingly, the Court finds that it is 
immaterial to Plaintiffs' claims whether Defendants were party to Utah First Federal Credit 
Union's Participation Agreement with America West Bank. 
Additionally, Defendants argument that the Participation Agreement is void does 
not preclude summary judgment on 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC's claim for defi• 
ciency judgment. Indeed, Defendants concede that 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC 
may seek remedy against Defendants for the entire amount of deficiency, subject to its com• 
pliance with the requirements of Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-32. As to Utah First Federal Credit 
Union's claims. however, Defendants correctly note that both state and federal laws permit · 
a credit union to participate in loans only if the loan is made to the credit union's own 
members or the member of another participating credit union. See Utah Code Ann.§§ 7-9-
20(7)(b)(ii)(A) & (8)(c)(ii)(A); see also 12 C.F.R. § 701 .22(d)(2). The Court finds that genuine 
issues of material fact exist with regard to whether Roland N. Walker was a member of 
Utah First Federal Credit Union prior to its entry into the Participation Agreement with 
America West Bank. The Court is also unwilling on summary judgment to determine 
whether public policy renders the Participation Agreement void if no Defendants were, in 
fact, members of Utah First Federal Credit Union prior to its entry of the Participation 
Agreement 5 Accordingly, the Court concludes that the existence of genuine issues of mate-
rial fact preclude summary judgment in favor of Utah First Federal Credit Union on its 
claim for deficiency judgment. 
' Plaintiffs' argument that a private cause of action does not exist when a participation agreement violates state 
and federal credit union laws is irrelevant in this case, as Defendants are not attempting to assert a private 
cause of action. Rather, Defendants are asserting an affirmative defense to Utah First Federal Credit Union's 
ability to seek remedy for breach of the Defendants• obligations under the Revolving Credit Deed of Trust by 
virtue of the Participation Agreement. 
-6-
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The Court also concludes that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary 
judgment on Utah First Federal Credit Union•s unjust enrichment claim. It is unclear from 
the undisputed material facts whether Utah First Federal Credit Union actually conferred a 
benefit on Defendants by virtue of its Participation Agreement, or merely conferred a benefit 
on American West Bank. See Rawlings v. Rawlings. 2010 UT 52,129,240 P.3d 754 ("A claim 
for unjust enrichment in Utah requires proof of three elements: (1) a benefit conferred on 
one person by another; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and 
(3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to 
make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value.") (In• 
temal quotations omitted). Further, even if Utah First Federal Credit Union did confer a 
benefit on Defendants, the Court declines to determine on summary judgment whether it 
would be inequitable for Defendants to retain the benefit without remunerating Utah First 
Federal Credit Union given the Court's concern with the effect of public policy on the en-
forceability of the Participation Agreement See Id. The Court, therefore, DENIES Plaintiffs' 
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment insofar as it pertains to the claims of Utah First 
Federal Credit Union.6 
m. 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC's deficiency judgment claims 
are not batted by the three-month statute of limitations for deficien-
cy actions under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. 
The next defense raised by Defendant is that 2010·1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC's 
deficiency judgment claims are barred by the three-month statute of limitations of Utah 
Code Ann.§ 57-1-32. The Court finds that this argument is without merit. Utah First Feder• 
6 The Court rmds that Defendant's request for a Rule 56(f) continuance is rendered moot by the Court's denial 
of Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as it pertains to Utah First Federal Credit Union, as 
the request pertained only to discovery directed at Utah First Federal Credit Union and not 2010.1 
RADC/CADCVenture, LLC. Moreover, more th.an two yean have passed since this matter was initiated and 
the Court has previously permitted several extensions of time for discovery to be completed. Defendants have 
failed to assert a sufficient basis for an additional extension of time for discovery and given the undisputed ma-
terial factst the Court finds that additional discovery is unnecessary for a determination of 2010-1 
RADC/CADC Venture, LLC's claim for deficiency judgment 
-7-
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al Credit Union initiated this action on January 14, 2011, well within three months of the 
property•s December 6. 2011 trustee•s sale. Defendants subsequently filed their AllSwer to 
Plaintiff's Complaint and a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 17(a) arguing that 2010-1 
RADC/CADC Venture, LLC is the real party in interest to the action. Thereafter, Utah 
First Federal Credit Union filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint on August 15, 
2011, seeking to add 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC to the action as a party plaintiff. 
The parties then filed a Stipulation to Allow Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Withdraw 
Pending Motions on September 7, 2011. and Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint on 
November 15, 2011. 'While Defendants' Answer to Plaintiffs' First Am.ended Complaint 
raises an affirmative defense based upon the applicable statute of limitations, the Court finds 
that Defendants' prior stipulation to the inclusion of 2010-1 RADC/CADC Vent-i.1re, LLC 
as a party plaintiff constitutes a waiver of Defendant's statute of limitations defense. See So-
ter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993) ("A waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing 
right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it."). 
The Court finds that Defendants were clearly aware of 2010·1 RADC/CADC Venture, 
LLC's interest in the action by virtue of their Rule 17(a) motion to dismiss, but nevertheless, 
agreed to the filing of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint rather than challenging the amend-
ment as being futile as a result of a running of the statute of limitations. 
Regardless of Defendants' waiver, however, Rule lS(c) of the Utah Rules of Qvil 
Procedure provides that "[w]henever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleadings 
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in 
the original pleadings, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleadings." 
Utah R. Civ. P. lS(c). "This role allows a plaintiff to cure defects in his or her original com-
plaint despite the intervening running of a statute of limitations." Russell v. Standard Corp .• 
898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 1995). Rule l 7(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure additionally 
provides: 
-8-
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No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in 
the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been 
allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action 
by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such rati-
fication. joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the ac-
tion had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest. 
UtahR. Civ. P.17(a). 
In applying these rules to this case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs1 Amended Com• 
plaint relates back to the date of Utah First Federal Credit Union's original complaint The 
amendments included within Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint arose out of the same transac-
tion set forth in the original complaint and an identity of interest exists between Utah First 
Federal Credit Union and 2010-1 RA.DC/CADC Venture, LLC. Cf. Russell, 898 P.2d at 
265 (upholding the general rule that relation back under Rule lS(c) does not apply to 
amendments that add new parties who have no identity of interest with existing parties). 
While Defendants correctly assert that that prlvity of contract is generally an insufficient 
identity to interest for the purposes of relation back under Rule lS(c), see Perry v. Pioneer 
Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P .2d 214, 217 (Utah 1984), the i~ntity of interest between Plain-
tiffs goes beyond mere privity of contract. Plaintiffs assert shared, undivided interests in the 
deficiency on the Revolving Credit Deed of Trust. Based upon this identity of interest, the 
Court finds that Utah First Federal Credit Union's original complaint sufficiently placed 
Defendants on timely notice that a deficiency judgment was sought by the creditors of the 
Revolving Credit Deed of Trust. The Court. therefore, concludes that Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint relates back to the filing of Utah First Federal Credit Union's original complaint 
and 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC's deficiency judgment claims are not barred by 
the tbree•month statute of limitations of Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-32. 
This conclusion is also supported by the primary purposes of Utah's deficiency 
judgment statute. "The primary purposes of section 57-1-32 are (1) to prevent the creditor 
from purchasing the property for below market value at the trustee's sale and then suing the 
debtor or guarantor for a large deficiency. and (2) to provide a debtor or guarantor with 
-9-
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prompt notice that the creditor intends to pursue a deficiency so as to allow the debtor or 
guarantor to plan its finances." lv.fachock v. Fink, 2006 UT 30, 'J26, 137 P.3d 779. The Utah 
Supreme Court has further "recognized that section 57-1•32's requirement that a creditor file 
a deficiency action within three months is a 1procedural hurdle.• not an absolute bar to suit. 11 
Id. at ,I25. Accordingly, uas long as the primary purposes of the statute are satisfied, an ac-
tion will not be barred for failure to initially meet certain procedural requirements of section 
57-1-32.,. Id. at ,r26. Here, both purposes of Utah's deficiency judgment statute are satisfied, 
as the deficiency judgment Plaintiffs' seek is based upon the fair market value of the proper-
ty sold at the December 6, 2010 trustee's sale, and as the debtor and guarantor Defendants 
were timely placed on notice that a deficiency judgment was sought by the creditors of the 
Revolving Credit Deed of Trust. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss the Qaims of Plaintiff2010.l RADC/CADC Venture, LLC. 
IV. Defendants' estoppel argument is without merit and 2010-1 
RADC/CADC is entitled to judgment in the amount of the defi-
ciency on the entire amount of indebtedness, subject to any su.bse-
quendy determined interest of Utah First Federal Credit Union. 
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should be estopped from recovering a defi-
ciency on the entire amount of indebtedness under the Revolving Credit Deed of Trust, as 
this amount was not pied in Utah First Federal Credit Union's original complaint. Defend-
ants' argument. however, ignores that the Court twice permitted the filing of amended com-
plaints in this matter. The Court permitted the filing of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint 
on November 15, 2011, which added 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC as a party plain-
tiff to the litigation, following the filing of a stipulation to the amendment. The Court then 
granted leave for the filing of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint on September 6, 2012, 
following Defendants' failure to file an opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend. 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint asserts the entire amount of indebtedness under the 
Revolving Credit Deed of Trust that Plaintiffs now seek on summary judgment. Under these 
circumstances, the Court finds no basis to estop Plaintiffs from seeking the recovery of a de-
-10-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ruling on Dispositive Motions 
Case No. 110700200 
ficiency on the entire amount of indebtedness under the Revolving Credit Deed of Trust. 
Moreover, Defendants have cited no legal authority to support their argument other than 
Utah's deficiency statute, which states that "the complaint shall set forth the entire amount 
of the indebtedness that was secured by the trust deed." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. Plain-
tiffs' Second Am.ended Complaint satisfies this requirement and the primary purposes of the 
Utah's deficiency statute were satisfied by the filing of Utah First Federal Credit Union's 
original complaint. See Machock, 2006 UT 30, -n,}25-26. Moreover, by rule Plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint relates back to the date of the original pleading. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
lS(c) & l 7(a). The Court, therefore, finds that Defendants' estoppel argument is without 
merit Accordingly, the Court concludes that the undisputed material facts demonstrate that 
2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC is entitled to judgment against Dos Lagos, LLC and 
Mellon Valley, LLC in the amount of $1,916,701.91 1 the deficiency on the entire indebted-
ness under the Revolving Credit Deed of Trust. 7 The Court, therefore, GRANTS Plaintiffs' 
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment insofar as it pertains to 2010-1 RA.DC/CADC 
Venture, LLC, and DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alterna-
tive Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court: 
1) GRANTS Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment insofar as 
it pertains to 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture. LLC; 
2) DENIES Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment insofar as it 
pertains to Utah First Federal Credit Union; 
3) DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the aauns of Plaintiff 2010-1 
RADC/CADC Venture, LLC; and 
1 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC's judgment against Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC for the 
amount of the deficiency on the entire amount of indebtedness under the Revolving Credit Deed of Trost, 
LLC is, however, subject to any subsequently determined intereSt of Utah First Federal Credit Union. 
-11-
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4) DENIES Defendants• Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Aftema-
tive Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance. 
The Court directs Plaintiffs to prepare and submit an Order and a Judgment that is 
consistent with and reflects this Ruling. 
Date signed: '-f k/[3 
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Jeremiah R. Taylor 
TERRY JESSOP & BITNER 
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DUNN LAW FIRM 
P.O. Box2318 
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St Georget Utah 84771 
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The Order or Court is stated below: / i.~-\ ·, \ 
Dated: July 25, 2013 /s/ John ~ Mo : : \ -=J ...... :. 
04:06:03 PM District-_fg . ... .. ge/ 
Richard C. Terry, USB No. 3216 
Jeremiah R. Taylor, USB No. 13933 
TERRY JESSOP & BITNER 
341 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2705 
Telephone: 801/534-0909 
Fax: 801/534-1948 
rjchard@tiblawyers.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DA VIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
~; ... ,~-,i.'. i~f,;.-· 
.. •..,!--
---·-·--•···. ··--·· --- ·-·-·-- . . ---
UTAH FIRST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, I 
and 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC, as ! ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
successors in interest to AMERICA WEST 
BANK, : Civil No. 110700200 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DOS LAGOS, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company, MELLON VALLEY, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company, ROLAND NEIL 
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; 
ROLAND N. WALKER, an individual and 
SALLY WALKER, an individual, 
Defendants. 
Judge John R. Morris 
---- ----· ····---- ···---. 
On February 25, 2013, the Court held a hearing on (1) Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for 
Summary Judgment, (2) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Claims of Plaintiff 2010-1 
RADC/CADC Venture, LLC, and (3) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or in the 
Alternative Rule S6(f) Motion for Continuance. After reviewing the moving and responding 
papers, hearing the arguments, and considering the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
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interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and other evidence, if any, in the Court's file, the Court 
issued a Ruling on Dispositive Motions on April 25, 2013, which ruling is incorporated herein by 
reference. Consistent with that ruling, the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES 
that: 
I. Plaintiff 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC's ("RADC") Amended Motion for 
Summary Judgment is GRANTED. There is no genuine issue of material fact to the extent the 
case pertains to RADC, and RADC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law against Defendants 
Dos Lagos, LLC and Melon Valley, LLC, jointly and severally, as follows: 
$1,916,701.91 
$1,006,819.88 
$943.80 
$18,958.37 
$2,943,423.96 
The Principal Deficiency Amount on the entire 
indebtedness under the Revolving credit Deed of Trust with 
interest accruing on the principal amount from June 06, 2013, at 
the default contract rate of21 % per annum until paid in full. 
Accrued Interest from December 6, 20 I 0, to June 6, 2013 
at the default contract rate of 21 % per annum with interest 
accruing thereon from June 7, 2013, at the federal post-judgment 
rate plus 2% until paid in full. 
Costs incurred by RADC as of June 6, 2013, with interest 
accruing thereon from June 7, 2013, at the federal post-judgment 
rate plus 2% until paid in full. 
Attorney's Fees incurred by RADC as of June 6, 2013, with 
interest accruing thereon from June 7, 2013, at the federal post-
judgment rate plus 2% until paid in full. 
TOTAL JUDGMENT 
This Judgment may be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's fees 
expended in collecting this judgment. Plaintiffs shall serve upon Defendants any request to 
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augment the judgment, and Defendants shall have 30 days from the date of service to file an 
objection. 
2. Plaintiff Utah First Federal Credit Union's Amended Motion for Summary 
Judgment is DENIED. 
3. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Claims of Plaintiff 2010-1 RADC/CADC 
Venture~ LLC is DENIED. 
4. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Rule 56(f) 
Motion for Continuance are both DENIED. 
Approved as to fonn and content by: 
/s/ Michael C. Dunn 
Attorney for Defendants 
(signed electronically with Mr. Dunn's permission) 
***END OF DOCUMENT*** 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on July 12, 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT (proposed) to the following by electronic filing, by email, 
or by mail, postage prepaid. 
Michael C. Dunn 
Clifford V. Dunn 
Dunn Law Finn 
PO Box 2318 
110 West Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84771-2318 
mdunn@dunnfirm.com 
July 25. 2013 04:06 PM 
Isl Richard C. Terry 
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Richard C. Terry, USB No. 3216 
Jeremiah R. Taylor, USB No. l 3933 
TERRY JESSOP & BI1NER 
34) South Main Street, Suite SOD 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-270S 
Telephone: 801/S34-0909 
Fax: 80 l/S34-1948 
riehardrcvl,ibla~cra,com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Dated: August 16, l013 
02:21:01 AM 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DA VIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
UT AH FIRST FEDERAL CREDIT UNlON, 
and 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC, as 
successors in interest to AMERICA WEST 
BANK. 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DOS LAGOS, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company, MELLON VALLEY, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company, ROLAND NEIL 
FAMILY LIWTED PARTNERSHIP; 
ROLAND N. WALKER, an individual and 
SALLY WALKER, an individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Against Defendants Roland Neil Family 
Limited Partnership, Roland N. Walker, 
, and Sally Walker I Civil No. 110700200 
I Judge John R. Morris 
I 
I 
I 
On July IS, 2013, Plaintiff RADC moved this Coun for summary judgment against 
Defendants Roland Neil Family Limited Partnership, Roland N. Walker, and Sally Walker (the 
·•Guarantors'"). The time to oppose RAoc•s motion has passed, and Defendants have not filed a 
responsive memorandum or affidavit in opposition to RADC's motion. The Court has revicwod 
the moving papers and considered the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
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admissions, affidavits, and/or other evidence, if any, in the Court's file. The Court concludes that 
the foregoing show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
l. Plaintiff 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC's ("RA.DC") Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Guarantors is GRANTED. RA.DC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
against the Guarantors, jointly and severally, as follows: 
$1,9 J 6,701.91 
SJ ,076,293. 76 
S943.80 
$21,560.42 
$3,015,499.89 
The Principal Deficiency Amount on the entire 
indebtedness under the Revolving credit Deed of Trust with 
interest accruing on the principal amount from August 9, 2013, at 
the default contract rate of21% per annum until paid in full. 
Accrued Interest from December 6, 2010, to August 8, 
2013, at the default contract rate of 21 % per annum with interest 
accruing thereon from August 9, 2013, at the federal post-
judgment rate plus 2% until paid in full. 
Costs incWTed by RADC as of August 8, 2013, with 
interest accruing thereon from August 9, 2013, at the federal post-
judgment rate plus 2% until paid in full. 
Attorney's Fees incurred by RADC as of August 8, 2013, 
with interest accruing thereon from August 9, 2013, at the federal 
post-judgment rate plus 2% until paid in full. 
TOT AL JUDGMENT 
This Judgment may be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attomets fees 
expended in collecting this judgment. Plaintiffs shall serve upon Defendants any request to 
augment the judgment. end Defendants shall have 30 days from the date of service to file an 
2 
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objection. 
Hf:END OF DOCUME~ 
CER]TFlCATE QE SERVICE 
I certify that on August 8, 2013. I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT (proposed) to the following by electronic tiling. 
Michael C. Dunn 
Clifford V. Dunn 
Dunn Law Finri 
PO Box2318 
110 West Tabernacle 
St George, Utah 84771-2318 
mdunn@dunnfirm.com 
August 16, 2013 02:27 AM 
ts/ Richard C, Terey 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC, as 
successors in interest to America West 
Bank, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
DOS LAGOS, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company, MELLON VALLEY, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company, ROLAND 
NEIL FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSI-llP; ROLAND N. WALKER, 
an individual and SALLY WALK.ER, an 
individual, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No: 20140675- CA 
Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County, 
Farmington Departmen4 State of Utah 
The Honorable John R. Morris 
RICHARD C. TERRY (NO. 3216) 
JEREMIAHR. TAYLOR(NO. 13933) 
TERRY JESSOP & BIT~R 
341 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2705 
Telephone: (801) 534-0909 
Facsimile: (801) 534-1948 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
RADC 
Clifford V. Dunn (No. 933) 
Michael C. Dunn (No. 10927) 
DUNN LAW FIRM 
P.O. Box 2318 
St. George, Utah 84771-2318 
Telephone: (435) 628-5405 
Facsimile: (435) 628-4145 
Attorneys f9r Defendants/Appellants 
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complaint, RADCs filing happened long after the three month statute of limitations 
expired. Courts have held that the three month deadline set forth in section 57-1-32 can 
be a mere procedural hurdle, and not an absolute bar to suit only if the purposes of section 
57-1-32 are satisfied. Standard Federal Savines & Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbride, 1991 Utah 
LEXIS 42, 821 P.2d 1136, 1138. Those purposes include preventing windfalls to 
creditors, and providing the debtor and guarantor notice that the creditor intends to pursue 
the deficiency. Machock. 2006, UT 30~ ~26. The facts of this case show that RA.oc· s 
and Utah First' s conduct in the district court proceeding did not satisfy the purposes of 
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32. and RA.Dc·s complaint should have been dismissed. and the 
district court·s failure to do so is reversible error. 
The district court ruled in favor of RADC. and found that judgment in favor of 
RADC was appropriate for the full amount due under the Note, despite RADC only 
owning 48% of the Note. and despite a finding that the judgment in favor of RADC \\"as 
subject to a factual detennination regarding Utah First" s interest in the Note. The district 
court·s summary judgment in favor of RADC based on the full amount of the Note \\·as 
reversible error. 
a. The district court should not have granted judgment for RADC based on the full 
amount of the Note, subject to a later derermination of Utah First ·s interest. 
In its ruling. the district court denied Utah Firsrs motion for summary judgment. 
due to issues of fact, but granted summary judgment in favor of RADC. The district 
court's ruline for RADC eranted RADC a deficiencv based on the full amount of the 
... - " 
indebtedness under the loan ($3,426,701.91). despite RADC being a mere 48% interest 
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holder. (R. p. 835-836) In entering this ruling~ the district court added a footnote which 
slated: ··[RADCrs judgment against Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC for the 
amount of the deficiency on the entire amount of indebtedness under the Revolving 
Credit Deed of Trust, LLC[sic] is, however, subject to any subsequent detennined interest 
of Utah First Federal Credit Union.'' (R. p. 836)(Exhibit A. p. 11 ). In making this 
detennination" the district court cited no law, and provided no valid reason for awarding 
RADC the full judgment rather than its proportionate share of the Note. 
The amended complaint that added RA.DC as a plaintiff asserted that RA.DC only 
owned 48% of the Note under which deficiency was being sought. (R. p. 304) Allowing 
RADC to recover more than its proportionate share of the note would subvert public 
policy and be in direct violation of Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32. The result of the ruHng is a 
windfall to RADC, the very thing the Code is intended to prevent. 
As noted previously, Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 has two primary purposes: 1) to 
preYent windfalls to creditors who buy properties at below market and pursue large 
deficiencies: and 2) provide notice to the debtor and guarantor of the creditor"s intent to 
pursue a deficiency. The district court in granting RADC's motion for the full amount of 
the deficiency, \'iolated the first articulated purpose of the statute. The district court 
judgment allows RADC to collect more than double what it may be entitled, and expose 
Defendants to the jeopardy of multiple claims against them. In fact~ the district court 
dismissed Utah Firsf s claims ·•without prejudice'' leaving the door open for a later claim 
by Utah First if it deems it appropriate to do so. (R. pp 1097-1101) The total amount of 
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RADC's judgment, if valid~ could have been no more than $920,016.91, 48% of a 
deficiency, when based on the full amount of Note. More appropriately, the amount 
could be no more than $148,691.52, 48% of a deficiency based upon the amount of the 
note as alleged in the original complaint of RADC (See Section e below). 
At the same time it ruled in favor of RADC's motion for summary judgment, the 
district court ruled that there existed genuine issues of material fact related to Utah Firsfs 
claims (R. p. 832). The district courfs ruling makes it is impossible for a judgment in 
favor of RADC to have been detenninable as a matter of law~ because the district court" s 
ruling was subject first to a detennination of Utah First's interest. RADCs judgment 
cannot be detennined as a matter of law, when its final value relies entirely upon the 
detennination of speci fie and genuine issues of fact. 
Either the judgment in favor of RADC was appropriate, but not in an appropriate 
amount~ or it was not appropriate because there existed genuine issues of material fact 
and the matter must be remanded for that determination. Either wav, the district court 
erred and this Court should overturn its rulings. 
b. Defendants' stipulation to allolv an amended complaint did not constitute a n·aiver 
of Defendants' right to assert a statute of limitations defense. 
The district court" s ruJing concluded that,;~[ w]hile Defendants' Answer to 
Plaintiffs~ First Amended Complaint raises an affinnative defense based upon the 
applicable statute of limitations, the Court finds that Defendants' prior stipulation to the 
inclusion of 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC as a party plaintiff constitutes a waiver 
of Defendants~ statute of limitations defense.,. (R. p. 833) In support of its position., the 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UT.AH 
2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC, as 
successor in interest to America West 
Bank, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
RE.PLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 20140675-CA 
DOS LAGOS, LLC, a Utah limited District Court Case No. 110700200 
liability company, :MELLON 
VALLEY, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company, ROLAND NEIL FA1v1ILY 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; ROLAND 
N. Wi\LKER, an individual and 
Si\LL Y WALKER, an individual, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah 
The Honorable John R. Morris 
Richard C. Terry 
Jeremiah R. Taylor 
TERRY JESSOP & BITNER 
3 9 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Evan A. Schmutz (3 860) 
Jordan K. Cameron (12051) 
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
3301 N. Thanksgiving Way, Ste 400 
Lehi, Utah 84043 
Telephone (801) 375-6600 
Facsimile (801) 375-3 865 
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ARGlJ"""l\1:ENT 
I. RA.DC IS NOT ENTITLED TO A FlTLL DEFICIENCY lJNTIER THE LOA.."N ANTI 
P_A.RTICIPATION AGREEJv1ENTS. 
The district court misconstrued the Loan Agreement, the Commercial Guaranties, 
and the Participation Agreement when it ruled that RADC ,;vas entitled to judgment for 
t.he full deficiency under the Note, despite RA.DC only o-wn.ing 48% of the Note. 
Under Utah contract law, 
[w]hen determining whether the plain language is ambiguous, [the court] 
attempt[s] to harmonize all of the contract's provisions and all of its terms. [T]o 
harmonize the provisions of a contract, we examine the entire contract and all of 
its parts in relation to each other and give a reasonable construction of the contract 
as a whole to determine the parties' intent. Also, [ w]hen interpreting the plain 
language, we look for a reading that harmonizes the provisions and avoids 
rendering any provision meai."1.ingless. 
Nolin v. S & S Const., Inc., 2013 UT App 94, ~ 13, 301 P.3d 1026, 1029 cert. denied sub 
nom. Nolin v. S & S Const., 312 P.3d 619 (Utah 2013) (citation and Lr1ternal quotation 
marks omitted); see also .McNeil Engineering v. Bennett, 2011 UT App 423, ,8 Ct..Tnder 
well-accepted rules of contract interpretation, we look to the language of the contract to 
determine its meaning and the intent of the contracting parties. \Ve also consider each 
contract provision ... in relation to all of the others, with a view tO\'vard giving effect to 
all and ignoring none. If the language '"'ithin the four corners of the contract is 
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the 
contractual language: and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law.:,) ( citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, :'the specification oftenns in a contract 
implies the exclusion of all not expressed.'' 17A C.J.S. Contracts§ 415. 
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In relevant part, the plain language of the Loan Agreement provides that the 
';Borrower agrees and consents to Lender's sale or transfer, whether now or later, of one 
or more participation interests in the Loan to one or more purchasers .... Borrov,1er also 
agrees that the purchasers of any such participation interests will be considered as the 
absolute owners of such participation interests. Borrower further ... unconditionally 
agrees that either Lender or such purchaser may enforce Borrower's obligation under the 
Loan irrespective of the failure or insolvency of any holder of any interest in the Loan.'' 
(R. p. 771 (emphasis added).) 
Under the district court's ruling, RADC is entitled to the full amount of the Note, 
or the entire indebtedness of the Defendants. However, ';Indebtedness" is defined in the 
Loan Agreement as "the indebtedness evidenced by the Note or Related Documents, 
including all principal and interest together with all other indebtedness and costs and 
expenses for which Borrower is responsible under this Agreement or under any of the 
Related Documents." (R. p. 772.) In other words, if the parties negotiated and intended 
for a participation interest to be entitled to the entire indebtedness under the Loan 
Agreement, it would have provided that "the purchasers of any such participation 
interests will be considered as the absolute owners of [the Indebtedness]," or similar 
language. The parties clearly never intended a participation interest to grant rights of 
ovvnership or collections against the entire deficiency. While it is undisputed that RADC 
has a right to its own participation interest of 48%, the district court overreached wh~n it 
awarded RADC the entire deficiency. 
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The provisions of other contracts at issue confirm that the district court erred ,vhen 
it awarded RADC the entire deficiency. The Commercial Guaranties contain language 
consistent "With the Loan Agreement, specifically, that ''Guarantor authorizes Lender, 
either be.fore or after any revocation hereof, ,,~ithout notice or demand and without 
lessening Guarantor! s liability under this Guaranty, from time to time ... (G) to sell, 
transfer, assign or grant participations in all or any part of the indebtedness .... "(R. pp. 
779, 782.) Vlhile participation interests are allov,;ed, there is nothing to indicate that a 
participation interest is transformed into a larger interest that may claim an entire 
deficiency. Surely, the Commercial Guarantee cannot be read to create a contractual 
right to multiply the total amount m,,ed by Defendant. 
In addition, the Participation Agreement defines the parameters of the 
participation of Utah First Federal Credit Union in America West Bank's Loan 
Agreement with Defendants. Under the Participation Agreement, Utah First Federal 
Credit Union received a "Participation Equal to: $1,300,000.00." (R. p. 786.) Further, 
Utah First Credit Union's participation share is explicitly 52%, while America West 
Bank's retained share is 48%. (R. p. 787.) There is nothing in the Participation 
Agreement that entitles America West or RADC, as a successor to America West Bank's 
share, to have a judgment for the entire deficiency. 
As noted in the Brief of Appellants, and for which RADC provides no counter, 
lvlachock v. Fink_ stands for the proposition that Section 57-1-32 may bar suit by a 
creditor to prevent windfalls to the creditor. 2006 UT 30, ~ 26, 137 P.3d 779. In this case, 
awarding RADC an entire deficiency when it is only entitled to a 48% participation 
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interest is a windfall to RADC. 1 The district court's ruling allows RADC to collect more 
than double what it may be entitled, and exposes Defendants to an unwarranted additional 
judgment in the event the district court ultimately grants Utah First a deficiency judgment 
based on its percentage. (R. pp. 1097-1101, the district court dismissed Utah First' s 
claims vvithout prejudice). Such a result would amount to a windfall to RADC. 
II. ISSlJES REMAIN REGARDING THE STATUTE OF L™1TATIONS THAT 
PRECLUDE ENTRY OF JlJDG1\t1ENT IN FAVOR OF RADC. 
A. Until the Trial Court determines Utah First's rights under the 
Participation Agreement, it cannot determine whether RADC's action 
relates back to the original complaint filed by Utah First. 
The Utah Code dictates that a deficiencv action must be brou~t within three ~ ~ 
months after any sale of property under a trust deed. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. 
The parties do not dispute that Utah First initiated an action within three months, rather, 
the parties dispute whether the addition of RADC as a separate party plamtiff and its 
assertion of its own separate claim for deficiency, long after the expiration of the three 
month statute oflimitation, relates back to Utah First's original filing under Rule 15(c) or 
Rule 17(a). Appellees conceded that ,vhere an amended complaint adds an additional 
1 RADC arguments regarding the amount it is owed, even under a 48% o~rnership 
interest, are unsupported by basic math. The first Complaint filed with the trial court 
alleged a deficiency amount of $1,819,774.97. (R. p. 3; see also R. pp. 225-226 and 551-
552). The Second Amended Complaint alleged a deficiency of $3,426,701.91. (R. p. 
639). RADC attempts to justify the amount it alleged in its Second Amended Complaint 
by arguing that the Original Complaint mistakenly alleged a total indebtedness of only 
$1,~19,_774.97 which inadvertently took into accqunt.only Utah First's ·s2% interest in the 
Note. (see R.:·p.-3; see also R. pp: 225-226 and 551-552; Brief of Appellee, p. 6, ~'if 26-
27).-~owever, 52% of$3,426,701.91 does not equal $1,819,774,97. Iri fact,. 52% of 
$3,426,701.91 is $1,781,884.99. Similarly, 48% of $3,426,701.91 does not equal 
$1,606,926.94, as RADC argues, but rather, is $1,644,8i6.92. (See Brief of Appellee at p. 
7, 'if 29). -
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